Hitler issuing his declaration of war against Poland in the Reichstag on September 1, 1939.
2,746 words
Part 5 of 5 (Part 1 here, Part 4 here)
A German war with Poland was now a certainty, but a new continental war involving Britain and France was not. The most important obstacle to the widening of the conflict was that Britain quietly viewed French participation as an indispensable precondition of her own involvement, and the French had not committed themselves to action against Poland. Indeed, sentiment within the French leadership was largely opposed to intervention.
Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the morning of September 1. He emphasized his longstanding attempts to resolve issues with foreign nations through peaceful revision. Poland had rejected proposals more generous than any other German leader had dared to offer. Hundreds of thousands of people in Danzig and the Corridor were suffering from Polish countermeasures since she declared partial mobilization March 23. Unlike Poland, Germany had faithfully carried out the provisions of the minority treaty of November 1937.
Hitler had announced his own position in the dispute on April 28. Since then, he had waited four months in vain for some response from the Polish side. No great power could tolerate such conditions indefinitely.
Germany’s dispute with Poland did not affect the Western powers’ vital interests. Hitler had never asked and never would ask anything from Britain and France, and he ardently desired an understanding with them.
The German Chancellor then announced his war aims. He intended to solve the Danzig and Corridor questions, and to bring about a change in German-Polish relations. He would fight until the existing Polish government agreed to peaceful coexistence or until another Polish government was prepared to accept this. He was pursuing limited objectives and not insisting on the annihilation of the Polish armed forces or the overthrow of the Polish state.
Hitler claimed the German Reich had spent 90 billion Marks for defense purposes during the previous six years. This was an exaggeration: About half of that sum had gone for public works with no direct connection to armament. His juggling of the figures was an effort to discourage Britain and France from declaring war on Germany.
Following Hitler’s speech, a bill was introduced for the annexation of Danzig to the Reich. It passed unanimously.
The indefatigable Birger Dahlerus continued his mediation efforts on September 1, seeking permission from the British Foreign Office to come to London to present the German case. At 1:25 PM he received a definite refusal: The British authorities would not agree to support further negotiations unless German troops withdrew from Poland and Danzig.
That evening, Prime Minister Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons, claiming that “the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man, the German Chancellor.” He claimed Hitler’s recent suggestion that a Polish envoy come to Berlin for negotiations was a command for Poland to accept Germany’s terms without discussion. This was patently untrue, but as Hoggan observes, “the Polish case was so weak that it was impossible to defend it with the truth.”
Chamberlain promised to keep British casualties to a minimum by attacking Germany primarily from the air. This was a tacit admission that Britain planned to let the French do most of the bleeding. No wonder the French government was less enthusiastic at the prospect of war!
Halifax delivered a similar speech in the House of Lords. He insisted the English conscience was pure, and proudly added that he would not wish to have changed anything about British policy. As Hoggan notes, Halifax retained this smug complacency even in his post-war memoirs.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Britain demanded an immediate Anglo-French ultimatum to Germany. Bonnet hoped there would never be such an ultimatum, but he replied simply that it would be impossible to consider the matter until after the convening of the French Parliament on September 2. In fact, Bonnet was trying to arrange an international peace conference, despite worries about British intransigence. He had the support of Prime Minister Daladier and most Cabinet ministers. This greatly worried Halifax, who wired Britain’s ambassador in Paris that the French attitude was causing grave misgivings in London. He added, “We shall be grateful for anything you can do to infuse courage and determination into M. Bonnet.” To the British Foreign Secretary, anyone who opposed his plans for war could only be a coward.
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On the afternoon of September 1, Daladier sent an appeal to the Italians for help in arranging a conference. The message was welcome: Italy was proud of having launched a successful last-minute mediation effort in the Czech crisis the previous year, and hoped to do so again. Most of her efforts on September 1, however, were directed to convincing the world she would not intervene in Germany’s war against Poland. Italy still feared possible British attack, and an angry mob was besieging her embassy in Warsaw in the mistaken belief that she was aiding the Germans.
Ciano and Mussolini decided it would be wise to secure German support before approaching the French and British about a conference. Ciano wired Berlin at 10:00 AM on September 2 about Daladier’s solicitation of a diplomatic conference. Italy was prepared to propose an armistice that provided for the halting of the German and Polish armies at the positions momentarily occupied. Arrangements could then be made for a conference within two or three days. Hitler responded enthusiastically. An Italian diplomat who was present records that Hitler appeared positively eager to terminate German operations in Poland. He knew that with French support, Germany and Italy could prevail over Britain and Poland in any five-power conference. By 4:00 PM, the Italians had received word of German approval. Hitler declared he would be able to stop operations in Poland by noon the next day.
At this same hour, however, Halifax was insisting to Bonnet that Germany would have to complete the withdrawal of her forces from Poland and Danzig before Britain would agree to consider the conference plan. Bonnet knew that “no Great Power would accept such treatment.”
Ciano telephoned Halifax at 5:00 PM and was stunned to learn of his insistence on a full German withdrawal from Poland as a precondition for any conference. He assured Halifax this would destroy every chance for a peaceful settlement; the Italian diplomat still did not grasp that this was Halifax’s purpose. Moreover, as Hoggan notes:
He failed to perceive that British entry into the war was dependent on the consent of France, and that the British would not be able to destroy his peace plan if it was supported by France. The moment of decision for the Italian mediation effort had arrived, but Ciano was so overwhelmed with indignation at British intransigence that he failed to make the proper comments. He should have taunted Halifax with the fact that the French attitude toward the crisis was entirely different.
That very afternoon, Daladier’s promise to continue working for peace had been met with loud applause from all sections of the French Chamber.
One possible reason Ciano failed to play the French card was continued fear of British reprisals; recall Halifax’s August 20 threat that Britain would attack Italy immediately with most of her armed forces if she joined Germany in any war. Thus, Ciano’s conversation with Halifax remained brief and inconclusive, leaving him in a depressed mood.
Also at 5:00 PM, Bonnet was repeating to a British diplomat his refusal to make the withdrawal of German troops from Poland a condition for a conference. Bonnet said he would present this question to the French Cabinet, which would probably not reach a decision before 9:00 PM. Under pressure from Halifax, he promised that the French Cabinet would try to complete deliberations by 8:00 PM.
At 6:00 PM, Halifax learned that Ciano had been complimenting Bonnet on a response to Italian mediation efforts “more forthcoming and willing” than Halifax’s own. Was Ciano beginning to realize it was France and not Britain that held the key to peace? He instructed Britain’s ambassador to France to make a strong protest that “the position of the French government was very embarrassing to His Majesty’s Government.” The ambassador responded that the protest could not be delivered immediately since the French Cabinet was in session. At that very moment Bonnet was making his final, supreme attempt to commit his colleagues to a peaceful settlement, and there was nothing more Halifax could do to influence the outcome.
He then decided on a “desperate gamble,” telephoning Ciano at 6:38 PM to deceive him about the situation:
Halifax told Ciano that the withdrawal of the German troops from Poland was the essential condition for any conference, and he implied that Great Britain and France were in complete agreement on this important question. Ciano received the false impression that Bonnet had accepted this fatal maneuver to obstruct a conference prior to attending the French Cabinet, which was still in session.
Halifax further insisted that Britain would demand the restoration of the government of the League of Nations High Commissioner (then in Lithuania) to Danzig before considering the possibility of a conference. His imagination was endlessly fertile in throwing up obstacles to peace.
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The bluff was successful: Ciano never imagined a British Foreign Secretary would deliberately lie about another nation’s views. Both Ciano and Mussolini concluded that the cause of peace was lost. It was a disastrous mistake.
At 7:30 PM Chamberlain presented to the House of Commons a distorted version of the Italian peace plan, asserting that “Britain could not consent to negotiate while Polish towns were being bombarded and the Polish countryside invaded.” Halifax made a similarly misleading address to the House of Lords. In reality, both men knew Hitler had offered to suspend hostilities as a necessary condition for any conference.
At 8:20 PM, Ciano wired instructions to Italy’s ambassador in Berlin announcing that Mussolini had formally withdrawn his offer to mediate among Britain, Germany, Poland, and France. Hitler was advised to abandon plans for an armistice.
At that very moment, the French Cabinet was adjourning its first session in Paris without having reached a decision on the conference plan. A still hopeful Bonnet was then informed of the withdrawal of the Italian mediation effort. At 8:30 PM he put through an urgent telephone call to Ciano:
Bonnet explained that France had not actually accepted the British condition of a German troop withdrawal. Ciano expressed amazement, but did not see how Italy could retrieve her blunder of cancelling her mediation plan. Bonnet no longer had the German assurance for an armistice. Ciano insisted that a new mediation effort would be unpropitious under these circumstances, and the French Foreign Minister reluctantly agreed.
Hoggan comments, “This conversation is a striking example of the manner in which resignation and fatalism can paralyze the will under the enormous pressure of a crisis situation.”
Bonnet had no sooner put down the receiver than another French minister appealed to him with tears in his eyes to get back on the telephone and insist Italy launch a new mediation effort on condition that the German troops halt their advance. Hitler, he said, would very likely agree to these terms. “Bonnet sadly replied that, in his opinion, there was no longer the slightest doubt that such an effort would fail.”
Having concluded his speech to the House of Lords shortly after 8:00 PM, Halifax was waiting impatiently for news from Rome. At 9:30 PM he received a wire that the Italians “do not feel it possible to press the German government to proceed with Signor Mussolini’s suggestion.” The war he sought was finally within his grasp: All that now remained was to obtain an official French declaration.
Chamberlain telephoned Daladier at 9:50 PM, claiming with considerable exaggeration that he had faced an “angry scene” in Parliament when he said he was still consulting with France on the time limit for an ultimatum. He told Daladier he wished to inform the British public before midnight that an ultimatum would be delivered in Berlin by both Britain and France at 8:00 AM the next day, September 3. Daladier’s answer was no: “He asserted in desperation that he still had good reason to believe that Ciano was about to renew his mediation effort [and] advised against any kind of diplomatic step before noon on the following day.”
The British were furious. Halifax decided on another gamble:
He telephoned Bonnet at 10:30 p.m. that the British ultimatum for 8:00 a.m. the next day would be communicated to the British public before midnight, regardless of the attitude of France. He was unable to disguise his basic dependency upon France. He confided that everything would proceed unilaterally up to the expiration of the British ultimatum at noon. Britain at that point would take no action unless the French had previously agreed to follow with their own declaration of war within twenty-four hours.
Hoggan pauses for an instant to consider the “fantastic situation” that might have ensued if the French had persisted in their refusal to deliver an ultimatum and the British had failed to act on theirs.
Halifax’s telephone call with Bonnet lasted a long time, and Halifax did most of the talking. He then
drew up a memorandum on the conversation in which he concluded, after some hesitation, that Bonnet had “finally agreed.” French resistance crumbled rapidly in the face of Halifax’s self-assurance. Bonnet concluded fatalistically that, with the Italians now out of the picture, it would be futile to continue to frustrate British designs.
Bonnet was a sincere friend of peace, but at least twice on the evening of September 2 his will proved weaker than Halifax’s, both during his 8:30 call to Ciano and his 10:30 conversation with Halifax himself. The French ultimatum followed the British in well under 24 hours, and Europe was at war.
* * *
Hoggan’s gripping narrative of the last days of peace, especially the brinksmanship of September 2, provides more than enough support for his contention that
there was no justification for the later fatalism which suggested that World War II was inevitable after 1936 or 1938. The British had to work very hard until the evening of September 2, 1939, to achieve the outbreak of World War II. The issue was in no sense decided before that time.
Some readers may be surprised at the absence of Winston Churchill’s name from this narrative. In the period covered by The Forced War, Churchill was the leader of the war party in the House of Commons, and does merit a few mentions, but Hoggan states:
Churchill does not bear direct responsibility for the attack on Germany in September 1939, because he was not admitted to the British Cabinet until the die was cast. The crucial decisions on policy were made without his knowledge, and he was amazed when Halifax suddenly shifted to a war policy in March 1939. Churchill was useful to Halifax in building up British prejudice against Germany, but he was a mere instrument in the conduct of British policy in 1938 and 1939.
The war which began in September 1939 would prove a catastrophe for Poland and a Pyrrhic victory for Britain, which was reduced to the status of an American vassal and was shortly thereafter deprived of her Empire. The true victor would be the Soviet Union, which ended up controlling half of Europe for four and a half decades after the conclusion of hostilities. As noted above, virtually everyone underestimated the Bolshevik colossus in 1938 and 1939.
Yet despite its disastrous outcome, the struggle against Hitler remains the founding myth of the post-war world. Every foreign head of state perceived as a threat is “the new Hitler,” and every attempt to deal with such a man through negotiation is “appeasement” and a failure to learn the “lessons of Munich.” The persistence of this pernicious mental template among the powerful continues to threaten the peace of the world and makes Hoggan’s guided tour of musty diplomatic archives as relevant to the future of our civilization as today’s headlines.
A correction of the record is also a matter of simple justice. Millions of people continue to believe the literal truth of British and Polish propaganda from 1939 — namely, that these nations did everything possible to maintain peace, but were forced to take a heroic stand against monstrous aggression from a madman determined to take over the world. Hoggan, writing at the height of the Cold War, concludes:
The German people, especially, have been laden with an entirely unjustifiable burden of guilt. It may safely be said that this is the inevitable consequence of English wars, which for centuries have been waged for allegedly moral purposes. It is equally evident that the reconciliation which might follow from the removal of this burden would be in the interest of all nations which continue to reject Communism.
Found at https://counter-currents.com/2023/12/hitler-the-peacemaker-part-5/
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